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The 1997-98 Asian crises have refocused attention on exchange rate management of East 
Asian countries. Most views expressed criticize the pre-crisis US dollar peg regime as one of the 
causes of the crisis. Then, the question arises as to whether, after the crisis, the East Asian 
countries are simply returning to the pre-crisis US dollar standard, or whether they have learned a 
lesson from the crisis and are finding another path to follow. This article examines post-crisis 
exchange rate management in selected East Asian countries. The main findings are as follows: 
First, we found that the exchange rate flexibility of all the sample countries has increased from 
the pre-crisis period towards the post-crisis period. Second, we further found that the post-crisis 
managed exchange rates of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand have been sensitive to domestic 
inflation rates, and that Korea has raised the weight assigned to the Japanese yen while reducing 
the US dollar dominance in her post-crisis exchange rate management. Third, we cannot 
necessarily say that there is robust evidence that a regional coordination in the sample countries’ 




Exchange rate management is one of the central issues of 
macroeconomic policies. Since the postwar period, there has been a 
long-term debate over the merits of fixed versus floating exchange rates.  
The debate, which is typically framed in terms of the trade-off between 
credibility and flexibility, has gone through several swings of the 
pendulum. Recently, the debate on exchange rate regimes has become 
focused on whether or not the intermediate regimes such as target zones, 
crawling and basket pegs are vanishing, in other words, whether or not 
exchange rate regimes are moving to a corner solution with the “hard 
peg” or the “free float”. So far, no clear consensus has been reached.  
The 1997-98 Asian crises have refocused attention on exchange 
rate management of East Asian countries. Most views expressed criticize 
the pre-crisis US dollar peg regime as one of the causes of the crisis. It is 
said that this regime induced short-term external over-borrowing and 
caused the appreciation of real exchange rates with the loss of 
competitiveness. Then, the question arises as to whether, after the crisis, 
the East Asian countries are simply returning to the pre-crisis US dollar 
standard, or whether they have learned a lesson from the crisis and are 
finding another path to follow. 
This article examines post-crisis exchange rate management in 
selected East Asian countries. Specifically, the two main questions are 
these: whether the flexibility in the managed exchange rate has 
increased from the pre-crisis period (of the dollar peg system) towards the 
post-crisis period, and whether a regional coordination in the post-crisis 
exchange rate management has been strengthened. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the 
debates on exchange rate regimes and clarifies this article’s position 
among the debates. Section 3 conducts empirical studies of the 
post-crisis exchange rate management on the selected East Asian 
countries. Section 4 presents concluding remarks.  
 
2. Debates on Exchange Rate Regimes and This Article’s Position 
 
This section reviews the debates on exchange rate regimes and 
clarifies this article’s position among the debates. We first summarize the 
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long-term history of debates over the merits of fixed versus floating 
exchange rates since the postwar period. We then focus on recent 
debates over the exchange rate regimes: the corner solutions hypothesis, 
the “Fear of Floating” hypothesis, and the regional cooperation in 
exchange rate policies. Based on the reviews, we clarify this article’s 
position among the debates on exchange rate regimes. 
 
2.1 Long-term Debates: Fixed versus Floating Exchange Rates 
 
We first review the long-term history of debates over the merits of 
fixed versus floating exchange rates since the postwar period. Frankel 
(1999) summarizes the advantage of each exchange rate regime as 
follows: the two big advantages of a fixed exchange rate are (1) that it 
reduces transactions costs and exchange-rate risk which can discourage 
trade and investment, and (2) that it provides a credible nominal anchor 
for monetary policy; the big advantage of a floating exchange rate is 
that it enables a country to pursue an independent monetary policy. In 
short, the adoption of a fixed regime automatically acquires all the 
credibility accumulated by the issuer of the anchor currency, while 
floating rates maximize the flexibility with which the authorities can use 
monetary policy for economic stabilization. Therefore, the history of 
debates can be framed in terms of the trade-off between credibility and 
flexibility. 
The debates have gone through several swings of the pendulum, 
meeting the demands of the times. Frankel et al. (2000) reviews the 
postwar history of the debates as follows. At the time of Bretton Woods, 
the architects of the postwar system favored fixed exchange rates, 
attributing the economic instability of the interwar period, in part, to 
flexible rates. During the 1960s, a growing number of economists came to 
favor floating rates, responding to the widening US balance-of-payments 
disequilibrium that led to the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. 
During the 1980s, the accumulating experience with high inflation in 
many parts of the world brought the pendulum back. Setting a target for 
the exchange rate came to be viewed as one way for central banks to 
realize monetary stabilization. New theories of rational expectation and 
dynamic consistency concluded that a commitment to such a nominal 
anchor, if credible, would even allow disinflation without the usual costs 
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of lost output and employment. In the late 1990s we faced the second 
complete swing of the pendulum out and back, as conventional wisdom 
blamed exchange rate targets. The trend toward increased preference 
for greater exchange rate flexibility reflects many instances in which 
countries faced balance of payment difficulties for crises in Mexico 
(1994-95), East Asia (1997-98), Russia (1998), and Brazil (1999). The debates 
over the exchange rate regime still seem to continue. 
 
2.2 Recent Debate (1): Corner Solutions Hypothesis 
 
We next focus on recent debates over the exchange rate regimes. 
The hypothesis of the “Corner Solutions” is one of the new propositions. As 
the latest study, Fischer (2001) discusses this hypothesis. This hypothesis 
involves opting either, on the one hand, for full flexibility, or, on the other, 
for rigid institutional commitments to fixed exchanges in the form of 
currency boards or full monetary union with the dollar or euro. It is said 
that the intermediate exchange rate regimes such as the target zones, 
crawling and basket pegs, are no longer feasible and are going to 
disappear. 
This hypothesis has the following analytical backgrounds. First, the 
principle of the Impossible Trinity explains the hypothesis. This principle 
says that a country has to give up one of three goals: exchange rate 
stability, monetary independence, and financial market integration. It 
cannot have all three simultaneously. Summers (1999) suspect this means 
that as capital market integration increases, countries will be forced 
increasingly to more pure floating or more purely fixed regimes. ADB 
(2001) explained, from the practical viewpoint, that large and liquid 
international capital markets make it more difficult for national authorities 
to support a shaky currency peg, since the resources of the markets far 
outstrip the reserves of even the best-armed central banks and 
governments. Effective defense of exchange rates requires raising 
interest rates and restricting domestic credit, something that will have 
significant costs especially in emerging market economies with their 
fragile financial and political systems. 
Second, Frankel et al. (2000) offered a theoretical rationale for the 
corners hypothesis by introducing the notion of “Verifiability” and 
suggested that a simple peg or a simple float may be more verifiable by 
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market participants than a more complicated intermediate regime. They 
also offered some empirical evidence that intermediate regimes do in 
fact inspire less credibility than institutional arrangements such as 
dollarization. 1 
 
2.3 Recent Debate (2): “Fear of Floating” Hypothesis 
 
There are some counter-arguments against the hypothesis of the 
“Corner Solutions”. One of them argues from empirical studies that many 
countries that are categorized as having floating currencies are, in effect, 
holding the intermediate exchange rate regimes. Calvo and Reinhart 
(2000) insisted that a careful reading of the evidence on exchange rate 
policy presents a strikingly different picture; countries that say they allow 
their exchange rate to float mostly do not – there seems to be an 
epidemic case of the “fear of floating”, particularly among emerging 
market economies. They presented an analytical model that suggests 
that, even in the best of times, when countries retain voluntary access to 
international capital markets, lack of credibility will lead to the “fear of 
floating”. They also found, in their empirical analyses across 154 
exchange rate arrangements, a low variability of exchange rates and a 
high volatility of central bank reserves that suggest significant central 
bank intervention. 2 
When it comes to the issue of credibility, Frankel et al. (2000) 
argued that, since the 1990s was a period during which high inflation was 
no longer such a big problem as previously in most places, the focus is 
now more on establishing in the financial markets credibility that the local 
currency will not lose value against the dollar, than on credibility in the 
labor and goods markets that the currency will not lose value in terms of 
wages and prices. To be specific, the lack of credibility originates from 
incomplete domestic financial markets, as the “original sin” hypothesis 
tells us. Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) explained that the “Original 
sin” is a situation in which the domestic currency cannot be used to 
borrow abroad or to borrow long term even domestically, and that the 
problem is that a country whose external liabilities are necessarily 
denominated in foreign exchange is by definition unable to hedge.3 
Williamson (2000) also questioned the efficacy of the two-corner 
solution by stating that the currency boards have already been 
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subjected to substantial speculative pressure both in Argentina and in 
Hong Kong, and that a county with a freely floating rate may suffer from 
excess volatility of the exchange rate. He argued that the behavior of 
most of the emerging market countries is motivated not by an irrational, 
short-run “fear of floating”, but by legitimate concerns that floating will 
generate long-run misalignments. Williamson then recommends the BBC 
rules (basket, band, crawl) for emerging market economies. 
Kawai (2002), recognizing that the two-corner solution approach 
does not to be realistic in many emerging East Asian economies because 
of the “fear of floating”, stated that a reasonable exchange rate policy 
for the region would be to stabilize rates to a basket of currencies 
consisting of the US dollar, the yen and the euro, given emerging East 
Asia’s diversified trade and FDI relationships with the United States, Japan, 
and the European Union and given the continued high exchange-rate 
volatility among the tri-polar currencies. French and Japanese staff (2002) 
also argued that a possible solution for many emerging market 
economies could be a managed floating exchange rate regime 
whereby the currency moves within a given band with its center targeted 
to a basket of currencies including the dollar, the yen and the euro. 
 
2.4 Recent Debate (3): Regional Cooperation 
 
The recent debates over the exchange rate regimes are going a 
step further, arguing that there must be coordination in selecting an 
exchange rate regime among countries in the region with similar trading 
structures and with high intra-regional trading shares. Ogawa and Ito 
(2000) argued that: An optimal exchange rate regime of country A (say, 
Thailand) depends on the exchange rate regime of country B (say, 
Malaysia), with which country A has a high proportion of trade; The dollar 
weights in the currency baskets of the two countries are determined as a 
Nash equilibrium; It may be helpful to calculate and publish the typical 
currency basket unit for the region so that the coordination failure may 
be avoided. Kawai (2002) also insisted that for intra-regional exchange 
rate stability, greater coordination on the currency basket policy would 
be desirable, and this needs to be supported by regional surveillance 
and financing mechanisms.4 
As for the possibility of an optimal currency area in East Asia, 
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Bayoumi, Eichengreen, and Mauro (2000) made an empirical analysis by 
using a structural VAR model. This paper analyzed the extent to which 
ASEAN may be suitable for a regional monetary arrangement. On the 
economic front, it reviewed evidence on patterns of trade, economic 
shocks, the extent of factor mobility, and the monetary transmission 
mechanism, and found that ASEAN today is less suitable for a regional 
monetary arrangement than the euro area was before the Maastricht 
Treaty. On the political front, it analyzed the prerequisites for monetary 
integration in light of 50 years of European experience. It concluded that 
a firm political commitment would be the key to ensuring the form of a 
regional monetary arrangement. 
 
2.5 This Article’s Position in the Debates on Exchange Rate Regimes  
 
Ito (2001) stated that the debate over what would be desirable 
exchange rate regimes for Asian countries seems likely to continue, 
although the selection of an exchange rate regime will be crucial for 
Asian countries’ further recovery and beyond. For the empirical analysis in 
the following section, we here clarify this article’s position among the 
fore-mentioned debates on exchange rate regimes. 
First, among the recent debates of Section 2.2 to 2.4, we follow the 
“Fear of Floating” hypothesis, considering that the two-corner solution 
approach does not seem to be realistic in many emerging East Asian 
economies; we presume that emerging East Asian economies have 
adopted “soft peg” regime in the exchange rate management, namely, 
intermediate regime placed between free floating and such a rigid fixed 
system as currency board. Taguchi (2002), by examining the volatilities of 
their foreign exchange reserves, showed that Indonesia, Korea, the 
Philippines and Thailand are holding to the “soft peg” even in the 
post-crisis period regardless of their announcement of the “free float”. 
Second, we then examine whether the flexibility in the managed 
exchange rate has increased from the pre-crisis period (of the dollar peg 
system) towards the post-crisis period, under the framework of the 
intermediate exchange rate regime. Concerning with the principle of the 
Impossible Trinity, Frankel et al. (2000) makes a negative comment on the 
explanation of “Corner Solutions” by Summers (1999), by stating that 
economists tend to believe in interior solutions for most problem, and that 
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there is nothing that prevents the government from pursuing a managed 
float in which half of every fluctuation in demand for its currency is 
accommodated by intervention and half is allowed to be reflected in the 
exchange rate. Following this argument, the intermediate regime can be 
an interior solution by giving up a bit of all three. As capital market 
integration increases, one of the interior solutions will force countries to 
raise the flexibility of exchange rate. We can speculate that the 1997-98 
Asian crisis had been caused by the inconsistent policy to stick to the 
dollar peg regime (inflexible exchange rate) under the capital market 
integration. Therefore, It may be crucial whether the crisis-experienced 
East Asian countries, learning a lesson from the crisis, have raised the 
flexibility of exchange rate in the post-crisis period. 5 
Third, we will not step further into the issue of whether there must be 
coordination in selecting an exchange rate regime among countries in 
the East Asian region. As Bayoumi, Eichengreen, and Mauro (2000) 
implied, it seems to be premature for emerging East Asian economies to 
form the optimum currency area. This paper, as a very first step of 
approaching to regional coordination issues, simply examines whether a 
regional coordination in the East Asian post-crisis exchange rate 
management has been strengthened, through analyzing actual 
exchange rate movements.  
 
3. Empirical Studies on Selected East Asian Countries 
 
We here conducted an empirical analysis of the post-crisis 
exchange rate management on the selected East Asian countries. We 
here focus, as sample countries, on the hardest-hit crisis countries among 
the East Asian countries: Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, 
and Thailand (we here exclude Malaysia because she has formally 
adopted the US dollar peg system since 1998). In this section, we first 
review the previous studies analyzing directly the post-crisis exchange 
rate management in East Asian countries. Second, we examine whether 
exchange rate flexibility has really increased from the pre-crisis period 
towards the post-crisis period in the sample countries. Third, we then 
analyze the factors to make exchange rate movements more flexible in 
the post-crisis period. Fourth, we examine whether a regional 
coordination in the sample countries’ post-crisis exchange rate 
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management has been strengthened. 
 
3.1. Previous Studies 
 
We here pick up some important studies on the post-crisis 
exchange rate management selectively. First, Mckinnon (2001) analyzed 
how the post-crisis exchange rate regime has evolved since 1998. 
According to his analyses, dollar exchange rates, particularly when 
observed on a high-frequency (daily) basis, have become as stable as 
they were before the crisis. Therefore, he stated that the East Asian dollar 
standard, except for Indonesia, seems to be resurrecting itself, and that 
the “fear of floating” identified by Calvo and Reinhart (2000) is shown at 
higher frequencies to be a rational response to capital market conditions 
in emerging markets. Second, Kawai (2002) also examined the evolution 
of exchange rate arrangements in East Asia’s emerging market 
economies over the last ten years. According to his analyses, in the post 
crisis period the dollar has regained prominence in some countries 
(notably in Malaysia), while its dominance has been reduced and 
exchange rate flexibility has risen in others (notably in Indonesia). 
Interesting is the observation that Korea and Thailand appear to have 
shifted to a de facto currency basket arrangement with significant 
weights on the US dollar and the yen, similar to Singapore’s managed 
floating arrangement. 
To sum up, McKinnon (2002) argues that the post-crisis East Asian 
exchange rate managements are simply returning to the pre-crisis de 
fact dollar peg system, while Kawai (2002) insists that exchange rate 
flexibility has risen with the US dollar dominance reduced. We have to 
notify that both analyses focus on the highly -frequent (daily) exchange 
rate management. 
 
3.2. Examining Exchange Rate Flexibility 
 
We turn to the empirical examination on whether exchange rate 
flexibility has really increased from the pre-crisis period towards the 
post-crisis period. 
According to the IMF classification, after the crisis, Indonesia, Korea 
and Thailand moved from Managed Float to Independent Float. The 
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Philippines keep Independent Float. (Malaysia, on the contrary, shifted 
from Managed Float to Pegged to US dollar in 1998.) The IMF classification 
of exchange rate arrangements, however, dose not necessarily reflect 
actual exchange rate management, since it is based on member 
countries’ formally announced regimes. Here comes the necessity to 
observe actual data on exchange rates as well as official 
pronouncements. 
For the purpose of seeing exchange rate flexibility, we calculate 
the coefficient of variation in the nominal exchange rate year by year. 
We use the monthly data of nominal exchange rate, taken from the 
International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund. We 
divide the sample period into two parts: the pre-crisis one from 1993 to 
1996 and the post-crisis one from 1999 to 2002. Figure 1 and Table 1 simply 
show the movements of nominal exchange rate indexes expressed as the 
US dollar price of a unit of local currency. Figure 2 and Table 2 report the 
trends of the coefficient of variation in the nominal exchange rate.  
We observe that: before the crisis, the Values of Won, Peso and  
Baht (except Rupiah) nearly leveled off, while after the crisis, they have 
shown monthly fluctuation; the coefficient of variation of all currencies 
has clearly enlarged from the pre-crisis period to the post-crisis period. 
From this observation, we speculate that: in the pre-crisis period the de 
facto dollar peg system was simply maintained except for in Indonesia; 
the exchange rate flexibility of all the sample countries has increased 
from the pre-crisis period towards the post-crisis period.  
 
3.3. Identifying the Factors for Raising Exchange Rate Flexibility 
 
The next step is to identify the factors to make exchange rate 
movements more flexible in the post-crisis period. As we stated in Section 
2.5, the previous studies show that Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines and 
Thailand are holding to the intermediate exchange rate policy even in 
the post-crisis period regardless of their announcement of the “free float”. 
In this context, the rising flexibility of exchange rate means that the 
benchmark for the choice of a reference rate in the managed exchange 
rate may be diversified in the post-crisis period from the only US dollar in 
the pre-crisis period. To verify this point, we conduct regression analysis to 





We follow the work of Frankel and Wei (1994) and specify the 
regression model in the following way.  
 
?log(Local Currency/SWF)=?1?log(USD/SWF)+?2?log(JPY/ SWF)+?3?
log(DEM(EURO)/ SWF)+?4?log((CPI+CPI-1)/2)+ ? 
 
Where SWF is the Swiss franc, USD is the US dollar, JPY is the Japanese yen, 
DEM is the German mark and?is assumed to be a well-behaved error 
term, following N(0, ?2). EURO (the Euro currency) is used in the post-crisis 
period instead of DEM. CPI is the Consumer Price Index of the local 
country with a time lag to take the causality relationship between CPI 
and the value of local currency into account. The Swiss franc is chosen as 
an arbitrary numéraire for measuring variations in the exchange rate 
because it is an independently floating currency of an advanced 
country, which nonetheless carries little weight in Asia’s trade. Based on 
the first difference of logarithms (percentage changes), the simple 
regression model is multivariate ordinary least squares for each country 
and time period. All the sample data are monthly ones taken from the 
International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund, for 
the sample countries – Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand.  
According to Frankel and Wei (1994), if the local currency is tightly 
fixed to some particular value of the US dollar, then the regression 
coefficient?1 should be discernable and approximately unity, while the 
others, ?2 and ?3, are close to 0. Another crucial variable is the local 
CPI. If the coefficient of the local CPI, ?4, is significantly positive, we 
assume that the domestic inflation rate can be one of the factors for 
determining a reference rate in managing exchange rate. 
Before the regression, we test the stationarity of all the data series 
by using the unit root tests of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and 
the Philips-Perron (PP) test (for the test methodology, see Matsuura and 
McKenzie 2001). Appendix reports that at the 5 percent significance level, 
all the first-differenced data series are confirmed as stationary in both 
tests, thereby suggesting that a regression analysis using all the 
first-differenced data series is valid. 
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Analytical Method: Chow’s Test and Dummy for Parameter  
We hare take two steps in our analysis. First, we conduct Chow’s 
breakpoint test to examine whether there was a structural change in 
exchange rate management from the pre-crisis period to the post-crisis 
period. The data are broken up into two periods: the pre-crisis one from 
January 1993 to December 1996, and the post-crisis one from January 
1999 to April 2003. We show the F-statistics with probabilities for the 
hypothesis of parameter stability over different periods. We then pick up 
the currencies in which a structural change is identified. Second, 
concerning the currencies with a structural change, we identify the 
factors to cause the structural change by examining whether each 
parameter in regression model has been significantly changed in the 
post-crisis period. For verifying the parameter change, we modify the 
regression model as follows.  
 
?log(Local Currency/SWF)=(?1+?’1D)?log(USD/SWF) 
  +(?2+?’2D)?log(JPY/SWF)+(?3+?’3D)?log(DEM(EURO)/SWF) 
+(?4+?’4D)?log((CPI+CPI-1)/2)+?’5 D+? 
 
where D is the post-crisis dummy from January 1999 to April 2003. In this 
modified regression, if some coefficients ?’ are significant, they are the  
causes of a structural change in the post-crisis period. So we can identify 
the changes in factors for determining a reference rate in the post-crisis 
exchange rate management.  
 
Results and Interpretations 
Table 4 and Table 5 report the results of Chow’s test and the 
modified regressions. The main observations and their interpretations are 
as follows. First, The results of Chow’s breakpoint test indicate that the 
hypothesis of parameter stability over the pre- and post-crisis periods is 
rejected on Won at the one percent significance level, on Baht and Peso 
at the five percent level and accepted on Rupiah. The post-crisis 
structural change in exchange rate management is, therefore, verified 
on Baht, Peso and Won. Second, the results of the modified regression 
show that the coefficients of the US dollar in three currencies are 
significantly positive throughout the pre- and post- periods and that they 
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are an approximate unity at least in the pre-crisis period. Korea, the 
Philippines and Thailand, therefore, seem to be holding the “soft peg” to 
the US dollar, during not only the pre-crisis period but also the post-crisis 
period, regardless of its assigned weights. Third, in the modified regression 
for Won, the coefficient of the Japanese yen with the post-crisis dummy is 
significantly positive while the coefficient of the US dollar with the 
post-crisis dummy is significantly negative. The Won appears to shift the 
weight from the US dollar to the Japanese yen in the post-crisis period as 
a factor for determining a reference rate. In other currencies and in the 
German mark (Euro) as a reference rate, there seem to be no definite 
changes in the weights from the pre-crisis period to the post-crisis period. 
Fourth, the coefficients of the local CPI with the post-crisis dummy are 
significantly positive in all three currencies. Korea, the Philippines and 
Thailand, therefore, may have come to take the domestic inflation rates 
into account as one of the factors for determining a reference rate in the 
post- crisis period. 
We here compare the result of the above estimation with that of 
Kawai (2002). Kawai (2002) shows that Korea and Thailand have 
significantly shifted the weight from the US dollar to the Japanese yen in 
their post-crisis managed floating arrangement. Our estimation identifies 
such a weight-shift in Korea but not in Thailand. We speculate that the 
difference in the result might mainly come from the difference in the 
frequency in exchange rate management to be analyzed; Kawai (2002) 
conducts a Frankel-Wei type of regression on a daily base for examining 
the highly- frequent exchange rate management (the original analysis by 
Frankel and Wei (1994) is on a weekly base). On the other hand, our 
analysis concentrates on the lower- frequent (monthly) exchange rate 
management. In fact, the data for the key variable in our analysis, CPI, is 
usually available only on monthly base.6 
 
Real Exchange Rate  
One of the results of regression analysis above tell us that, in Korea, 
the Philippines and Thailand, the factors for determining a reference rate 
in managing exchange rate may be diversified from the US dollar 
dominated in the pre-crisis period towards including the domestic 
inflation rate in the post-crisis period. We can interpret the results in such a 
way that the managed exchange rates in three of the sample countries 
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have been sensitive to their domestic inflation rates in the post-crisis 
period. We can also verify the sensitivity to domestic inflation rates by 
examining the trends of another index of real exchange rate. 
The real exchange rate is an indicator for a country’s international 
price competitiveness, specifically of a country’s prices relative to those 
of other countries. A country’s real exchange rate levels off when an 
exchange rate is fully sensitive according to a country’s prices relative to 
those of other countries. We define the real exchange rate as follows 
(taking the Korean Won as an example). 
 
RER (US dollar/Won) = ER (US dollar/Won) ?(CPI Korea / CPI US dollar ) 
 
where RER is real exchange rate, ER is nominal exchange rate, CPI is 
consumer price index. 
Figure 3 and Table 3 indicates the trends of real exchange rates. 
During the pre-crisis period, each real exchange rate shows a clear trend 
of appreciation. This is because in that period each country stick to the 
simple US dollar peg system so that its higher domestic inflation rate than 
US inflation rate make each real exchange rate appreciate. During the 
post-crisis period of 1999-2003, on the other hand, each real exchange 
rate indicates no clear trend of appreciation, and except for in Indonesia 
a rather stable movement. We can guess that the post-crisis managed 
exchange rates of three sample countries have been sensitive to 
domestic inflation rates compared with the pre-crisis ones. 
Figure 4 directly describes the relationship between nominal 
exchange rate index (expressed as the US dollar price of a unit of local 
currency) and domestic consumer price index during both the pre- and 
post- crisis period. We can confirm the clear contrast of the picture 
between the pre-crisis period and the post-crisis period; while the 
pre-crisis nominal exchange rate keeps stability in spite of the hike of CPI, 
the post-crisis nominal exchange rate moves towards depreciation with 
successive CPI increase. 
 
3.4. Examining Regional coordination of Exchange Rate 
 
We turn to the issue of whether a regional coordination in the 
sample countries’ post-crisis exchange rate management has been 
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strengthened. To materialize regional coordination in exchange rate 
management, we conduct Granger causality test on bilateral relation 
among regional currency values; we test, for example, that Baht 
Granger-cause Peso and that Peso Granger-cause Baht. We show the 
F-statistics with probabilities for the null hypothesis of Granger causality. 
Table 6 reports the results of Granger causality test. We observe the 
followings. First, in the pre-crisis period, the null hypothesis of Granger 
causality is accepted on all bilateral relations. There has been no 
evidence on regional coordination in the pre-crisis exchange rate 
management from the viewpoint of Granger approach. Second, in the 
post-crisis period, the null hypothesis is rejected on the causality from Peso 
to Won at the five percent significance level, and on the causality from 
Peso to Baht as the ten percent significance level. On all the other 
bilateral relations, however, the null hypothesis is accepted. Only from the 
results of Granger causality test above, we cannot necessarily say that 
there is robust evidence that a regional coordination in the sample 
countries’ exchange rate management has been strengthened as a 
whole in the post-crisis period. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this article, we set out to examine, conducting empirical studies 
on the selected East Asian countries, whether the flexibility in the 
managed exchange rate has increased from the pre-crisis period (of the 
dollar peg system) towards the post-crisis period, and whether a regional 
coordination in exchange rate management has been strengthened in 
the post-crisis period. 
First, we found that the exchange rate flexibility of all the sample 
countries has increased from the pre-crisis period towards the post-crisis 
period, by examining the trends of the coefficient of variation in the 
monthly nominal exchange rate. Second, we further found, through 
conducting Chow’s test and regression analysis and investigating the 
trends of real exchange rates, that the post-crisis managed exchange 
rates of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand have been sensitive to domestic 
inflation rates, and that Korea has raised the weight assigned to the 
Japanese yen while reducing the US dollar dominance in her post-crisis 
exchange rate management. Third, Granger causality test does not 
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necessarily tell us that a regional coordination in the sample countries’ 
exchange rate management has been strengthened as a whole in the 
post-crisis period. 
The following issues still need analysis: First, the post-crisis period is a 
little too short to provide sufficient monthly data. We will, therefore, need 
the re-analyses to get more consolidated outcomes by keeping track of 
the upcoming data. Second, it may be useful for our analysis to extend to 
non-crisis countries and to develop through a comparative study 





1. In addition to the fore-mentioned arguments, some studies simply support floating 
exchange rate regimes. For example, Mussa et al. (2000) argued that floating regimes 
appear to have been helpful in handling a variety of economic shocks for many 
emerging market countries, by stating that the policy requirements for maintaining a 
pegged exchange rate can be very demanding in circumstances of high 
international capital mobility as seen in the tequila crisis of 1995 and the 
Asian/Russian/Brazilian crises of 1997-98. Eichengreen (1999) also stated that the IMF 
should more forcefully press for the adoption of more flexible exchange rates by most 
of its developing country members, especially by those with open capital accounts. 
2. Masson (2000) also made a careful statistical examination of the way in which 
countries have changed their exchange rate regime over the years. He found that, 
although there has been some tendency for countries to polarize toward the extremes, 
it is far weaker than one would infer from the sort of summary of Latin American 
experience.  
3. McKinnon (2001) also describes the emerging-market debtor economy with original 
sin in such a way that: the term structure of finance is short, and there is no history of 
central bank independence. Correspondingly, there is a potential lack of confidence 
in the long-term exchange rate unless the government can effectively restrain itself. 
4. As a typical example of regional surveillance and financing mechanisms, the 
ASEAN+3 countries agreed to the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) of currency swaps and 
Surveillance at the Asian Development Bank meeting in Thailand in May 2000. 
However, the World Bank (2003) stated that it is too early to tell whether the CMI should 
be seen as a first step to establishing a collective system of common currency pegs, or 
as a mechanism for multilateral support to countries experiencing financial difficulties. 
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5. As for the analyses of the negative impacts of the dollar peg system on the external 
balances in the selected East Asian countries, see Taguchi (2003a) and Taguchi 
(2003b). 
6. Even on the analysis of the highly- frequent (daily) exchange rate management, 
McKinnon (2001) shows the different results from Kawai (2002); McKinnon (2001) claims 
that the East Asian dollar exchange rates, particularly when observed on a 
high-frequency (daily) basis, have become as stable as they were before the crisis 
(implies no significant weight-shift from the US dollar towards the Japanese yen). The 
difference in the results might come from the difference in the post-crisis estimation 
periods; Kawai (2002) estimates from January 1999 to June 2002 as the post-crisis 
period, while McKinnon (2001) does from January 1999 to May 2000. In the estimate of 
Kawai (2002), the significant weight-shifts from the US dollar to the Japanese yen in 
Korea and Thailand are identified mainly after July 2000, which is beyond the estimate 
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